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PREFACE 
This study is concerned with the effects of situational factors on 
cooperativeness in a conflict situation involving a communicative third 
party. More specifically, the effects of payoff structure and normative 
messages from a third party on cooperativeness of disputants in a Pri-
soner 1 s Dilemma Game are assessed. In addition, the relationship be-
tween attitudinal measures, behavioral intentions, and cooperative be-
havior are explored using standard linear regression. 
The author wishes to express his appreciation to his major adviser, 
Dr. Bob Helm, for his assistance and guidance throughout this research 
effort. Appreciation is also expressed to the other members of the com-
mittee, Dr. Brent Snow, Dr. James Price, and Dr. Al Carlozzi, for their 
valuable assistance in the preparation of the final manuscript. 
Finally, my deepest gratitude is expressed to God and my parents, 
Elaine and Harold Winkel, for the love and support they have given me 
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Statement of the Problem 
Studies of third party intervention in confl let (Rubin, 1980; Wall, 
1979) have for the most part involved mixed motive bargaining behavior 
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 1970; Chertkoff & Esser, 1976; Druckman & Sonoma, 
1976; Krauss, 1966; Pruitt & Johnson, 1970; Wall, 1979). The variables 
investigated have included mediation techniques (Johnson & Tuller, 1972), 
face saving behavior (Brown, 1968; Johnson & Tuller, 1972; Pruitt & 
Johnson, 1970), social goals and normative beliefs (Ajzen & Fishbein, 
1970; McNell & Reid, 1975). However, many of the results have proven 
contradictory and equivocal. The present study is designed to investi-
gate and perhaps to clarify the relationship between two major components 
which influence third party mediation in conflict. These components are 
(1) behavioral intentions, as discussed by Ajzen and Fishbein (1970), and 
(2) situational factors. 
Ajzen has demonstrated (Ajzen, 1971; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1970) that 
behavior is influenced by or is a function of behavioral intentions, made 
up of attitudes and normative beliefs (see Figure 1). An attitude may 
be thought of as a belief about some object or event and the evaluative 
aspects of that belief. A normative belief on the other hand refers to 
individuals' perceptions of the behavior expected of him by relevant or 
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Figure 1. Model of the Relationship Between Situational Variables, 
Behavioral Intentions, and Behavior 
N 
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Situational determinants consist of events occurring externally to 
the individual. Two such factors which have been shown to affect bar-
gaining in a dyadic situation are the payoff structure and persuasive 
communications directed at the participants (Ajzen, 1971; Ajzen & Fish-
bein, 19 70) . 
In one investigation (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1970), the effects of sever-
al situational variables on (cooperative) behavior were assessed. Moti-
vational orientation and payoff structure (i.e., Cooperation Index or 
Cl) were systematically varied in a two-person Prisoner 1 s Dilemma (PD) 
situation. To clarify the relationship between attitudes, normative be-
1 iefs and behavioral intentions, Ajzen and Fishbein employed an exten-
sion of Dulaney 1 s theory of propositional control. The model states that 
overt behavior (B) is mediated by behavioral intentions (Bl) which are 
in turn a joint function of an individual 1 s attitudes toward performing 
the act of cooperation (A-act) and his/her beliefs about what he/she is 
expected to do in a given situation (i.e., normative beliefs or NBs). 
Both motivational orientation and payoff structure produced significant 
differences in subjects' level of cooperation in a two-person PD game. 
In addition, these differences were in the hypothesized directions, 
with subjects in the cooperative treatment conditions exhibiting the 
greatest level of cooperative behavior. The results further revealed 
that behavioral intentions were highly predictive of game behavior, and 
that Bl were in turn a function of the attitude toward the act of cooper-
ation (A-act) and of the subjects' perceived expectations of the other 
player (NB). 
In summary, Ajzen and Fishbein 1 s (1970) extension of Dulaney 1 s the-
ory of propositional control was demonstrated to be highly successful in 
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predicting overt behavior from behavioral intentions in a two-person PD 
situation. 
In another study, Ajzen (1971) investigated the effects of persua-
sive communications on overt behavior in a two-person PD situation. 
Motivational orientation and type of persuasive message served as the 
independent variables. The persuasive messages were oriented either to-
ward changing subjects' attitudes (i.e., attitudinal message) or norma-
tive beliefs (i.e., normative message). In addition, each of these mes-
sages was designed to encourage either cooperation or competition in the 
PD situation. As in the previous investigation, Fishbein's extension of 
Dulaney 1 s theory of propositional control was employed to test hypotheses 
about the effects of persuasive communications on overt behavior in a 
two-person PD game. The results revealed that the attitudinal and norm-
ative messages affected behavior in the hypothesized directions. Enhanc-
ed cooperative behavior was demonstrated by subjects who received a gen-
eralized attitudinal message advocating cooperation, with a corresponding 
decrease in cooperative behavior by subjects receiving a competitive nor-
mative message and who were in the cooperative motivational orientation. 
As is evident, persuasive communications may have an effect on behavior 
in the direction advocated by the message. In addition, the regression 
equations predicting behavior from behavioral intentions under the two 
motivational orientations were effective to the extent that persuasive 
communications affected their respective targets. It was also demon-
strated that the attitudinal measures carried more weight in the predic-
tion of cooperative behavior with a competitive than cooperative motiva-
tional orientation, and that the normative belief measures were of great-
er relative importance in the cooperative motivational orientation. 
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Therefore, the attitudinal message had its greatest impact on behavior 
in the competitive motivational orientation while the normative message 
had its greatest effect in the cooperative motivational orientation. 
Again, Fishbein 1 s extension of Dulaney 1 s theory of propositional control 
proved to be effective in predicting behavior in a two-person PD situa-
tion. Another important conclusion which may be drawn from this inves-
tigation is the demonstration of behavioral change as the result of per-
suasive communications. However, these messages were of a general nature, 
and directed at participants in a two-person PD situation. 
While the relationship of these variables has been assessed sepa-
rately in dyadic bargaining situations, there has not been as yet a sys-
tematic investigation of them in a conflict situation involving a third, 
neutral party who makes suggestions. Furthermore, the normative and 
attitudinal messages to the participants have, in the past, been directed 
at the subjects in general, using the instructions. 
The purpose of the present study is to assess the effects of payoff 
structure and specific third-party messages (i.e., situational variables) 
on behavioral intentions and subsequent behavior (i.e., cooperativeness) 
in a conflict situation. This will be accomplished by systematically 
varying the payoff structure and third-party suggestions to the partici-
pants. 
Four major areas of research directly related to the present study 
are conflict, negotiation and mediation, attitudes, and attitude-behavior 
relations. Investigations relevant to the present problem within each 
area will be discussed. The relationships between several of these vari-




As pointed out by Rubin (1980), conflict is inherent in the process 
of interdependence between people. There are many different types of 
conflict: intrapersonal, interpersonal, intragroup, intergroup, and 
international (Deutsch, 1978). Consequently there are many variables 
affecting the course of conflict, including the characteristics of the 
parties, the nature of the issue giving rise to the conflict (i.e., moti-
vational significance), the social environment within which the conflict 
occurs, the interested audiences to the conflict, the strategies and tac-
tics employed by the parties in conflict, and the consequences of the 
conflict to each of the parties (Deutsch, 1978). 
Conflict may arise then out of the interaction between two persons 
(i.e., interpersonal conflict) resulting from a combination of many of 
the variables just mentioned. Furthermore, people emit behavior in the 
presence of each other, which then has natural consequences for all those 
present. These natural consequences in turn produce outcomes and rein-
forcements for the parties involved which in turn provide the opportuni-
ties for conflict and cooperation (Thibaut & Kelly, 1959; Tedeschi & 
Lindskold, 1976). But what exactly do we mean when we talk about con-
flict? Deutsch (1969) has described conflict as existing "whenever in-
compatible activities occur. 11 These incompatibilities may occur within 
individuals, groups, or nations, or between them. Furthermore, while 
situational determinants may affect the nature of conflict, there is a 
phenomenological component which should be considered as well. In other 
words, this experienced component to conflict may interact with situa-
tional determinants to produce unique perceptions and evaluations of the 
situation (e.g., attitudes and normative beliefs) which then transform 
the objective conditions into experienced conflict. 
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While a number of different typologies of conflict have been pro-
posed (Boulding, 1962; Rapoport, 1960), the typology of immediate inter-
est is one of mutual contingency. In this context, mutual contingency 
will refer to a situation where each person enters an interaction with a 
plan; however, each is responsive to the actions of the other and modi-
fies his plan as a result (Tedeschi & Lindskold, 1976). In this setting, 
there are usually a number of different issues involved. Some of the 
more salient issues include control over resources (Kuhn, 1963), values, 
beliefs, and the nature of the relationship between the parties (i.e., 
general orientation towards each other and interpersonal trust). 
Conflict among issues of mutual importance may lead to an impasse 
between the parties. There usually are any of a number of different 
avenues of conflict resolution open to the participants. For instance, 
the disputants may resolve the issues themselves through coercion, th rough 
unilateral withdrawal by one of the parties, or through negotiation. One 
other course of action is intervention by a third party, either at the 
invitation of the disputants or at the request of some external agency. 
It has been demonstrated that the style of third-party intervention 
affects bargaining behavior (Johnson & Tullar, 1972). Often an inter-
vention occurs in order to provide the disputants with advice or to im-
pose some binding decisions (Rubin, 1980). The former condition (i.e., 
third-party intervention involving non-binding suggestions) has been re-
ferred to as mediation. 
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Negotiation and Mediation 
The mediation process has been described by \.Jail (1979) as consist-
ing of at least three individuals (i.e., mediator, negotiator, and oppos-
ing negotiator) and three relationships (i.e., mediator negotiator, 
mediator-opposing negotiator, and negotiator-opposing negotiator). There-
fore, the nature of outcomes of the mediation process may be considered 
to be the result of an interaction between (a) the personal characteris-
tics of the three participants, (b) the nature of the three interpersonal 
relationships, and (c) situational factors. Regarding the personal char-
acteristics of the three participants, there are numerous investigations 
in the negotiation literature which describe the effects of the two nego-
tiators' personal characteristics and their interpersonal relationships 
(Chertkoff & Esser, 1976). Wall (1979) reports on both the negotiator-
opposing negotiator relationship and the mediator-negotiator relationship 
in a bargaining situation. Still other experiments on negotiation have 
demonstrated the effects of such factors as the need to maintain face in 
interpersonal bargaining (Brown, 1968; Pruitt & Johnson, 1970), style of 
third party intervention (Johnson & Tullar, 1972), size of conflict and 
sex of experimenter (Deutsch, Canavan, & Rubin, 1971), attitudes and nor-
mative beliefs (Ajzen, 1971; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1970; Krauss, 1966; McNeel 
& Reid, 1975), opponent's concession rate (Druckman & Sonoma, 1976; Wall, 
1977), and various types of messages (Ajzen, 1971; Wall, 1979). Payoff 
structure and whether negotiation takes place in the presence of others 
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 1970; Braver & Barnett, 1976; Brown, 1968) are situa-
tional factors which have been explored. 
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Attitudes 
Another related topic which deserves attention is that of attitudes. 
As Allport (1935, 1968) pointed out, the concept of attitude 11 is prob-
ably the most distinctive and indispensible concept in contemporary 
American social psychology 11 (1968, p. 59). Furthermore, although defini-
tions vary considerably, there seems to be "general agreement that a per-
son's attitude toward some object constitutes a predisposition on his 
part to respond to the object in a consistently favorable or unfavorable 
manner" (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1973, p. 41). However, there has been an 
accumulation of reports for more than 40 years which demonstrates rather 
low or nonsignificant relations between attitudinal predictors and be-
havioral criteria (cf. Wicker, 1969). Although the evidence has been 
discouraging, social psychology has recently been witnessing a revival 
of interest in the relationship between attitude and action (e.g., Ajzen 
& Fishbein, 1973; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977; Brannon, 1976; Liska, 1975; 
Schneider, 1976). In addition, several such studies have been concerned 
with attitude-behavior relations in interpersonal bargaining and con-
flict (Ajzen, 1971; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1970; Krauss, 1966; McNeel & 
Reid, 1975). Krauss (1966) demonstrated the effects of structural and 
attitudinal factors in interpersonal bargaining and interpreted them in 
terms of Heider's (1958) theory of cognitive balance. Ajzen and Fishbein 
(1970), on the other hand, present an interpretation of attitude-behavior 
relations in terms of Dulaney's (1967) theory of propositional control. 
According to Ajzen and Fishbein (1977): 
A single behavior is determined by the intention to perform the 
behavior in question. A person's intention is in turn a func-
tion of his attitude toward performing the behavior and of his 
subjective norm. It follows that a single act is predictable 
from the attitude toward the act, provided there is a high 
correlation between intention and behavior (p. 888). 
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Recent findings (Ajzen, 1971; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1970) have tended 
to show that attitude-behavior relations can have real consequences for 
interpersonal conflict. 
Attitude-Behavior Relations 
While attitude-behavior relations have been studied in the two-
person PD situation, little information exists regarding third-party in-
volvement. There is, however, evidence supporting a strong relationship 
between attitudes and behavior in a dyadic situation. It logically fol-
lows, then, that a similar relationship may exist when three individuals 
are involved. 
A useful model of attitude-behavior relations has been proposed by 
Ajzen and Fishbein (1970), employing an extension of Dulaney 1 s theory of 
propositional control. This model states that overt behavior is mediated 
by behavioral intentions which in turn consist of the sum of several 
weighted components. As pointed out by Ajzen and Fishbein (1970, 1977) 
these weighted components include attitudes and social normative beliefs. 
The model may be expressed algebraically as follows: 
B - Bl = [A- act]wO + [NBs]wl 
where 
B = overt behavior; 
Bl behavioral intentions; 
A-act= attitude toward performing a given behavior in a given 
situation; 
NBs =social normative beliefs; and 
wO,wl =empirically determined weights. 
This model has been demonstrated to be highly successful in the 
prediction of game behavior in a Prisoner's Dilemma paradigm (Ajzen, 
1971; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1970). 
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However, due to the addition of a third party in the present inves-
tigation, the inclusion of two other components are needed to enhance 
the predictive utility of the model. These additional components include 
attitude toward one's self based upon one's own behavior in the past (A 
- self), and perceived expectations of the mediator (NBs). This exten-
sion of Fishbein 1 s (1967) model may then be expressed algebraically as 
fo 11 ows: 
where 
B - Bl = [(A- act)wO + (A- sel f)wl] + [(NBl )w2 + (NB2)w3] 
A-self=attitude toward one's self based upon one's own be-
havior in a given situation; 
NBl =social normative beliefs related to the other player; and 
NB2 =social normative beliefs related to the mediator. 
This relationship may be seen in Figure l. 
In addition, it has been pointed out that any variable external to 
the model can influence behavioral intentions, and hence behavior, by 
indirectly affecting the various components of the model (Ajzen,. 1970). 
Two such external variables (i.e., situational variables) which 
seem most relevant to the process of third-party mediation are: (l) the 
outcome or payoff associated with a particular decision made by a parti-
cipant, and (2) the type of suggestion made by a third party to mediate 
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the conflict process. The selection of the situational variables to be 
employed in the present investigation is based on previous work carried 
out in a two-person PD situation (Ajzen, 1971; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1970). 
The Experimental Situation 
Edwards (1954) and others (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) have 
noted that game theory offers a useful method for investigating the 
decision-making process. As defined by Edwards (1954), 11 game" is a very 
general concept which refers to any "situation in which money (or some 
valuable equivalent) may be gained as the result of a proper choice of 
strategy" (p. 406). In a mixed-motive situation, such as the one in a 
Prisoner 1 s Dilemma game, there is an ambivalence about the relationship 
between the parties. The interests of each participant are partly coin-
cident and partly in conflict. Thus, this theoretical model might be 
usefully employed to study the process of conflict involving two or more 
individuals. 
The experimental situation selected for the present investigation 
is the Prisoner's Dilemma game. In the PD game players make repeated 
choices between two alternatives which have been called 11 Cooperation 11 
and 11 Defection 11 (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965). These two responses are 
assumed to serve the motives of cooperation and competition, respective-
ly. The choices of the players determine the payoff to each (see Figure 
2). Furthermore, it has been demonstrated (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965) 
that different payoff matrices tend to produce different amounts of co-
operation. Indices of 11 cooperative advantage11 associated with various 
matrices have been developed by these investigators. As pointed out by 
Ajzen and Fishbein (1970), the most generally useful index is the ratio 
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(Xl - X4)/(X3- X2) which has been referred to as the "Cooperation Index" 
by Terhune (1968: see Figure 3). The cooperation index has a range 
from 0 to 1, and in this particular investigation will be 0.90 for the 
cooperative payoff matrix, and 0. 10 for the competitive payoff matrix 
(Figure 2). The cooperative payoff matrix will be identical to the PD 
9ame used by Deutsch (1960). The competitive payoff matrix on the other 
hand will be designed to discourage cooperative choices (i.e., Choice 1). 
Since the present investigation involves three participants, the PD 
game as described above will be modified to include a third party. This 
will be accomplished by using three PD machines--two to be used by the 
players, and one to be used by the mediator. The particular choices of 
the players will be intercepted by the third party and transferred to 
the respective other player. The mediator will not alter the responses 
in any way, but will use a signaling feature of the equipment to make 
suggestions to the participants before their choices have been made. 
These suggestions will be designed to encourage either cooperation, com-
petition, or no-suggestion (see Procedures). 
The experimental manipulations in the present investigation are de-
signed to answer a number of questions related to third-party mediation 
of conflict. The questions to be answered include the following: What 
effect will the manipulation of the payoff structure of the situation 
have on subsequent cooperativeness in a conflict situation involving a 
neutral party? How will suggestions from a neutral third party affect 
cooperative behavior? In what ways will these two variables affect an 
individual 1 s attitudes and normative beliefs? Furthermore, what is the 













Cl = 0.90 Cl= 0.10 
Figure 2. Payoff Matrices for Cooperative and 











and behavior 1n a conflict situation involving neutral third-party inter-
ventions? 
Hypotheses 
To summarize, the main purpose of the present study is to assess 
how behavior and two situational factors (i.e., payoff structure and third-
party suggestions) are mediated by behavioral intentions in a PD game in-
volving third-party mediation. The experimental hypotheses are as fol-
lows: 
1. A greater percentage of cooperativeness, as reflected in the 
measures of A-act 1, A-act 2, A-self, NBl, NB2, and B, will occur in 
the situation of cooperative payoff matrix than in the competitive matrix 
situation. 
2. A greater percentage of cooperative choices will occur when sub-
jects receive a suggestion from the third party advocating cooperation. 
The smaller percentage will be exhibited by those receiving a competitive 
suggestion, with intermediate levels of cooperative choices in the no-
suggestion condition. 
3. The terms Bl and B in the model will be highly correlated, since 
behavior is mediated by behavioral intentions. 
4. A statistically significant multiple correlation will result for 
the five predictors (A-act 1, A-act 2, A-self, NBL, and NB2) and be-
havioral intentions, since behavioral intentions are a function of atti-
tudes and normative beliefs. 
5. A high multiple correlation will result between the predictor 
variables and behavior, as behavior is mediated by behavior intentions 
which are a function of attitudes and normative beliefs. However, the 
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passage of time following administration of the attitude questionnaire 
will affect behavior during the last 10 trials. Thus, the multiple cor-
relation for the predictor variables on behavior will be significantly 




A total of 60 undergraduate psychology students served as the exper-
imental subjects (30 males and 30 females). All received class credit 
for participation. Equal numbers of male and female subjects were ran-
domly assigned to all of the experimental conditions. 
Procedure 
Two subjects and two experimenters participated in each session, al-
though each subject was led to believe that s/he was playing against the 
other subject with a third party mediating the game. Upon arrival at 
the experimental laboratory, the two subjects with experimenter 1, who 
was posing as a naive subject, were escorted one at a time to adjacent 
experimental rooms by experimenter 2. Once in their respective rooms, 
each subject was told that their opponent (ostensibly the other subject) 
and the mediator (experimenter 1) are in two neighboring rooms. In addi-
tion, the subjects were informed that they, the two players, are in the 
two rooms, each connected with the mediator's room. 
Located on a table directly in front of each subject was a Prison-
er's Dilemma machine (Appendix C). The subjects were informed that they 
would play 20 trials of the game with the PD machine, and that the choice 
of each player would be relayed to the mediator before it was transferred 
l 7 
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to the respective other. In addition, the mediator would be making sug-
gestions to each player as to which choice s/he believed would maintain 
the greatest equity between them. A set of instructions was then read 
separately to each subject by experimenter 2 (Appendix A). Following 
administration of instructions, each subject took a five-item multiple 
choice quiz over procedures to ensure understanding (Appendix B). Once 
any final questions concerning the procedure were answered, experimenter 
2 went to the center room (mediator room) where experimenter 1 had orig-
inally been escorted, and the game began. Once the game had started, 
each subject played a two-person PD game, ostensibly with the other sub-
ject. In addition,; there was a third party (the mediator) who made sug-
gestions to each player before they made their response choices. 
Each subject actually played against a pre-planned game strategy 
which was 50 percent cooperative and 50 percent competitive. Each ex-
perimenter used the pre-planned strategy while operating a PD machine 
control unit designed to produce the responses of both the other player 
and the mediator. Thus, each subject was playing against an experimenter 
who was operating a PD control unit in the center room. The experimenter 
and control unit served the purpose of the other player and the mediator. 
\ 
The rationale for running subjects in this manner was expediency. The 
purpose of having experimenter 1 pose as a subject in the beginning of 
the experiment was to help make the situation believable for the sub-
jects. If there were only two subjects in the waiting room to begin 
with, the subjects might have had a tendency to think that there really 
was no third party involved. 
Prior to making a choice on each trial, subjects received a sugges-
tion from the mediator (i.e., experimenter 1 or experimenter 2). There 
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were three possible suggestions which could have been sent by the media-
tor: one advocated cooperation, one advocated competition, and the 
third said "no suggestion." The probability of any particular sugges-
tion being sent was determined prior to the beginning of the session. 
The pre-planned sequence of opponent suggestions and mediator sugges-
tions was determined randomly in advance. The probability structure 










PROBABILITY STRUCTURE OF MEDIATOR 1 S SUGGESTIONS 
AND OPPONENT 1 S STRATEGY 
Probability of Re-
Level Response sponse (Per Tri a J) 
Cooperative Mediator suggests 
choice 1 (coop.) p = 0.80 
Mediator suggests 
choice 2 (comp.) p 0. 10 
No suggestion p = 0. l 0 
Competitive Mediator suggests 
choice 1 (coop.) p = 0. 10 
Mediator suggests 
choice 2 (comp.) p = 0.80 
No suggestion p 0. JO 
No sugges- Medi a tor suggests 
ti on choice 1 (coop.) p 0. 10 
Mediator suggests 
cha ice 2 (comp.) p = 0. 10 
No suggestion p 0.80 
Neutral Choice (coop.) p 0.50 
Choice 2 (comp.) p = a.so 
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Once 10 trials were played, experimenter 2 returned to the subject 
rooms separately and administered a six-item attitude questionnaire 
·(Appendix D). After the subjects had completed the questionnaire, ex-
perimenter 2 returned to the mediator room and both subjects played 10 
more trials under the same experimental conditions. The percentage of co-
operative choices (i.e., Choice 1) during the second 10 trials was used 
as the measure of cooperative behavior. At the conclusion of the game, 
the subjects were debriefed and asked to sign a confidentiality state-
ment regarding procedural information (Appendices E and F). 
Independent Variables 
Other mediation studies (Ajzen, 1971; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1970; Johnson 
& Pruitt, 1972; Johnson & Tullar, 1972) have examined the effects of 
mediation on both the negotiator and his opponent. Unfortunately, the 
methodologies employed have provided confounded and equivocal data be-
cause they have not clarified the major sources of variance related to 
each participant. Thus, the findings of these investigations could have 
resulted from the negotiator's response to the technique, from the oppo-
nent's response, or from an interactive negotiator opponent response. 
In an effort to control for these confounds, the two treatments wi 11 be 
applied only to the negotiators (i.e., subjects). 
Mediator Suggestion Type 
The mediator made a suggestion on every trial prior to the sub-
ject's choice. The type of suggestion made depended upon the particular 
experimental condition. Once again the probability and order of the sug-
gestions made by the mediator were determined randomly prior to the 
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initiation of each game (see Table I). The same procedure was employed 
for the competitive and no-suggestion conditions as well. 
Cooperation Index 
The Cooperation Index as defined by Ajzen and Fishbein (1970) con-
sisted of two different payoff matrices designed to encourage either pre-
dominantly cooperative or competitive behavior. The payoff matrices em-
ployed may be seen in Figure 2. 
In Figure 2, the upper triangle in a cell corresponds to the nego-
tiator's payoff, while the lower triangle represents the opponent's pay-
off. The points in each cell of the matrices represent the points each 
participant received on a given trial, provided that the particular com-
bination of choices was made by the players. Choice l by either player 
represented a cooperative response, while Choice 2 represented a competi-
tive response. Furthermore, by manipulating the points in the individu-
al cells, a matrix encouraging primarily cooperative or competitive be-
havior was created (i.e., Cooperation Index). To enhance motivational 
commitment, the actual payoff consisted of $.01 per point. However, it 
was possible for subjects to lose money as well as gain money. Subjects 
were individually given one dollar and were told that they could keep 
whatever they won during the game. 
Opponent's Strategy 
It has been demonstrated that opponent's concession rate in a bar-
gaining situation affects subject's expectations and subsequent behavior 
(Druckman & Sonoma, 1976). Therefore, the opponent's strategy was held 
constant at 50 percent cooperative, and 50 percent competitive. This 
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was accomplished by determining the opponent 1 s response choice (i.e., 
Choice l or Choice 2) in advance of the experiment. The particular pat-
tern of responses on any given trial was determined randomly for all 
subjects, and the same strategy was employed for all subjects (see Table 
I ) . 
Dependent Variables 
Level of Cooperation 
The level of cooperation for a given subject (i.e., behavior or B) 
was determined by the frequency with which s/he made Choice 1 during the 
last 10 trials of the game. The frequency measure was then divided by 
10 to obtain the percentage. Only the percentage of Choice 1 was used 
in the data analysis, since the percentage of Choice 2 is the simple in-
verse of Choice l percentages. 
Attitude Questionnaire 
The attitude questionnaire provided measures for the following ex-
perimental variables, and is based on Ajzen and Fishbein 1 s (1970) con-
ceptualization of attitude-behavior relations. 
l. A direct measure of the subject 1 s attitude toward the act of 
cooperation (A- act) was based on the sum over four semantic differen-
tial scales. These four scales have been shown to have high loadings on 
the evaluative factor (cf. Osgodd, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957). The items 
were presented as follows: 
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Making Choice I is 
foolish : : : : : : wise -- -- -- -- -- -- --
good : : : : : : bad -- -- -- -- -- -- --
harmful : : : : : : beneficial -- -- -- -- -- -- --
rewarding __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ punishing 
2. Attitude toward competition was measured in the same way as 
attitude toward cooperation with the only difference being the introduc-
to ry statement. 
Making Choice 2 is 
foolish : : : : : : wise -- -- -- -- -- -- --
good : : : : : : bad -- -- -- -- -- -- --
harmful : : : : : : beneficial -- -- -- -- -- -- --
rewarding __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ punishing 
3. The subjects' attitudes toward their own behavior (A-self) were 
also measured using the four semantic differential scales and was read 
as fol I ows: 
The choices I made were 
foo Ii sh : : : : : : wise -- -- -- -- -- -- --
good : : : : : : bad -- -- -- -- -- -- --
harmful : : : : : : beneficial -- -- -- -- -- -- --
rewarding __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ punishing 
4. The perceived expectations of the other player (NBl) were mea-
sured as follows: 
My partner thinks that should make Choice % of 
the time, and Choice 2 % of the time. 
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5. The perceived expectations of the mediator (NB2) were measured 
as follows: 
The mediator thinks that I should make Choice % of 
the time, and Choice 2 % of the time. 
6. Behavioral intentions (Bl) were measured as follows: 
intend to make Choice 
% of the time. 
% of the time, and Choice 2 
CHAPTER I 11 
RESULTS 
A 2x3 completely randomized design with two levels of Cooperation 
Index (i.e., cooperative payoff matrix= 0.90 vs. competitive payoff ma-
trix= 0. 10) and three levels of Mediator Suggestion Type (i.e., cooper-
ative vs. competitive vs. no-suggestion) were used to investigate sub-
jects' cooperative behavior. An analysis of variance was computed to 
determine the effects of the independent variables on the level of coop-
eration by subjects. 
In order to determine the extent of the relationship which existed 
between behavior (i.e., percentage of cooperative choices in the PD game) 
and other indices of the study, product moment correlation coefficients 
were computed for behavior with behavioral intentions, behavior with 
attitudes, and behavior with normative beliefs, for all subjects. 
To determine the predictive utility of the two attitude and norma-
tive belief measures, in relation to game behavior and behavioral inten-
tions, standard linear regression was employed for all levels of the 
treatment variables col lapsed, based upon a least squares solution. This 
was computed once using game behavior as the criterion, and once using 
behavioral intentions as the criterion. The attitude and normative be-
1 ief measures were used as predictors. In order to determine the extent 
to which the treatment variables affected the prediction of game behavior 
and behavioral intentions, standard linear regression was also employed. 
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More specifically, for each independent variable which resulted in a 
significant main effect (i.e., as determined by the initial analysis of 
variance), the best possible linear regression model for each level of 
the treatment was computed using the General Linear Model procedure in 
the Statistical Analysis Systems computer package. Game behavior and 
behavioral intentions were used separately as criterion variables with 
the attitudes and normative belief measures acting as predictor vari-
ables. Correlation coefficients, regression coefficients, and multiple 
correlations are reported in the results. 
Effects of Experimental Manipulations 
The effects of the experimental manipulations on game behavior in a 
Prisoner's Dilemma situation were explored with the use of 2(CI) x 3 
(Mediator Suggestion Type) analysis of variance. There were two main 
effects and one interaction effect in the analysis. 
As can be seen in Table I I, the main effect for Cooperation Index 
was statistically significant beyond the .05 level of significance for 
the dependent measures of attitudes toward the act of cooperation (A-
act I), attitudes toward the act of competition (A-act 2), attitudes to-
ward self (A-self), behavioral intentions (Bl), and behavior (B). In 
addition, the mean difference~ for these measures were in the hypothe-
sized directions, with more cooperative responses being emitted by sub-
jects in the cooperative Cl condition. 
Furthermore, the behavioral intentions of the subjects reflected 
their actual game behavior as predicted, with more cooperative inten-
tions being expressed by subjects with a cooperative payoff matrix than 
































Figure 4. Mean Percentage of Choice 
for Behavior and Behavior-




further be seen in Table I I, the effect of Cooperation Index was stat is-
tically significant at or beyond the .01 level of significance for A-
act l, A-act 2, Bl, and B, while subjects' attitude toward themselves 
was statistically significant at p < .05 level. Regarding the attitude 
measures in particular, this effect may be seen in Figure 5. The main 
effect for Cooperation Index did not significantly affect the normative 
beliefs of the subjects, either toward their opponent or the mediator. 
TABLE 11 
MEAN RESPONSES FOR ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE, 
BEHAVIOR AND BEHAVIORAL INTENTIONS 
Dependent 
Variable 
A - act l 
A - act 2 





'''E. < .05. 
'°""E. < • 0 I • 
''"'"''E. < • 00 l . 
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As is evident, the first hypothesis that a greater percentage of 
cooperative responses would occur in the cooperative Cl than in the 





















Figure 5. Mean Attitude Ratings on Four 
?-Point Semantic Differen-
tial Scales for Cooperative 
and Competitive Cl 
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competitive Cl was fully supported for all variables except the norma-
tive belief measures (Appendix H). 
While the second hypothesis, that a greater percentage of coopera-
tive choices would occur in the condition where subjects received sug-
gestions from the mediator primarily advocating cooperation, was not 
supported, it is interesting to note that subjects' normative beliefs 
about the mediator were affected by this treatment. 
The main effect for the manipulation of Mediator Suggestion Type 
was statistically significant, p < .001 when data for normative beliefs 
about the mediator were analyzed. The means are in the expected direc-
tions with the greatest percentage of cooperative normative belief re-
sponses being emitted by subjects in the cooperative mediator suggestion 
condition (M = 61.50), the second greatest percentage being displayed by 
subjects in the no-suggestion condition (M = 47.50), and the smallest 
proportion by those subjects in the competitive condition (M = 36.40). 
Subjects were clearly cognizant of the suggestions they received from 
the third party. 
Relationship Between Bl and Behavior 
As predicted, a relationship was shown to exist between behavior 
(B) as measured by proportion of Choice l on the last 10 trials of the 
PD game, and behavioral intentions (Bl), r = .63 (Table I l 1). When the 
two levels of Cooperation Index (Cl) are examined separately, a statis-
tically significant, p < .001, positive relationship between Band Bl 
was demonstrated in the cooperative Cl condition, r = .72. The correla-
tion coefficient in the competitive condition did not reach statistical 
significance. 
TABLE 111 
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR ATTITUDE QUESTION-
NAIRE AND RESPONSES WITH BEHAVIOR 
A-act l - B A-act 2 - B 
. 5841d: 
;':£. < • 0 5. 
-/:;':£. < • 00 1 • 
-.621-1:;': 
A-self - B NBl - B NB2 - B 
-.425":-!' .024 . 2 70;': 
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Bl - B 
A more detailed examination of the relationship between Band Bl 
may be found in the individual eel ls of the 2 x 3 matrix in Table IV. As 
can be seen, a strong positive relationship exists between Band Bl in 
the condition where a third party makes suggestions predominantly advo-
eating cooperation, regardless of whether the situational determinant 
(i.e., Cl) is designed to encourage cooperation or competition, r = .81 
and r = .82, respectively. By contrast, much weaker relationships exist 
in the condition where a third party suggests a competitive response 
(i.e., Choice 2) 80 percent of the time, neither correlation coefficient 
reaching statistical significance. Finally, the strongest positive rela-
tionship between Band Bl was exhibited in that condition where the Cl 
was cooperative and the third party sent the no-suggestion message to 
the player 80 percent of the time, r = .88. 
Clearly, support was provided for the third hypothesis that a strong 
positive relationship exists between Band Bl in a conflict situation in-
volving an active third party. This relationship is particularly salient 
when the payoff structure of the situation encourages cooperative 
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behavior between individuals and where there is a third party who sends 
predominantly cooperative or no-suggestion messages to the disputants. 
TABLE IV 
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR BEHAVIORAL 
INTENTIONS WITH BEHAVIOR 
Mediator Suggestion Type Med. Sugg. Cooperation 
Index Coop. Comp. No-Sugg . Type Collapsed 
Cooperative 
Competitive 
'''E.. < • 0 l • 
~·,1,E. < . 001 . 
. 81 ,., 
. 82 ,., 
.so 
- . 18 
. 88''"'' 
.33 
Prediction of Game Behavior 
Regression: Cl Collapsed 
. 72,b': 
.23 
The fourth hypothesis, that Bl may be predicted from the present 
attitude and normative belief measures, was supported in the present in-
vestigation. As can be seen in Table V, the multiple correlation for 
the regression equation predicting Bl from attitudes and normative be-
1 iefs is .416 and statistically significant, p < .001. 
To test the hypothesis that Bl are a function of attitudes and nor-
mative beliefs, the multiple correlation coefficient for the model pre-
dieting behavior from attitudes and normative beliefs was compared with 
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the multiple correlation coefficient for the same model with Bl included 
as an additional predictor variable. If the inclusion of Bl in the re-
gression model would result in a significant difference between the mul-
tiple correlation coefficients for the two equations, one may conclude 
that Bl is measuring some unique aspect of attitudes and/or normative 
be! iefs, accounted for only by Bl. The results of the comparison reveal-
2 ed a significant difference (.080) between R for the two models, p < .01 
(Table VI). Therefore, while Bl may be a function of the attitude and 
normative belief measures in part, Bl is also indicative of some subjec-
tive estimate unique from those already included in the model. 
The results of the regression analysis further revealed that be-
havior, as well as behavioral intentions, may be predicted from a knowl-
edge of subjects' expressed attitudes and normative beliefs (Table VI). 
The multiple correlation for the regression model predicting behavior, 
R2 = .461, is statistically significant, p < .001. Thus, the fifth hypo-
thesis that behavior may be predicted from a knowledge of one's attitudes 
and normative beliefs in a PD situation involving a neutral third party 
was supported. 2 The comparison of R for the regression model predicting 
behavioral intentions, R2 = .416, and R2 for the model predicting behav-
ior, 2 R = .461, was also statistically significant, p < .05. However, 
this difference is not in the expected direction. Therefore, that the 
multiple correlation for behavior would be less than that for behavioral 
intentions due to the passage of time was not supported. However, when 
data for the competitive and cooperative Cl are considered separately, 
it is the cooperative condition (Table VI I), R2 = .632, in particular 
which provides the best regression model for predicting Bl from the atti-
tude and normative belief measures. 
A-act l - BI 
l . 74 l 
TABLE V 
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS AND MULTIPLE CORRELATION 
FOR ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES 
WITH BEHAVIORAL INTENTIONS 
Regression Coefficients 
A-act 2 - Bl A-self - Bl NBl - Bl N82 - BI 
-1. 167 -.098 -.063 .269 
;''£ < • 00 l . 




REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS AND MULTIPLE CORRELATIONS 
OF ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES ON BEHAVIOR 
FOR BI EXCLUDED VERSUS BI INCLUDED MODELS 
Regression Coefficients 
A-act 2 - B A-self - B NBl - B NB2 - B Bl - B 
- . 165 - . 124 . 011 .026 ·/:. 
- . I 21 -. 120 .014 .016 .037 
'''Exel uded. 
;"'"£ < • 00 I . 
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TABLE VI I 
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS AND MULTIPLE CORRELATIONS OF 
ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES ON BEHAVIORAL 
INTENTIONS AND BEHAVIOR, FOR COOPERATIVE Cl 
Regression Coefficients 
A-act 1 A-act 2 A-se 1 f NBl NB2 Bl 
2.51];': - . 875 -1 . 60 7 .230 . 4 72 ,., 
0. 184 -.066 -0. 136 .004 .022 
-0.055 . 017 0.017 -.018 -.023 • 0 9 5 ;'n'd< 
'''E. < .os. 
''"''£. < . 01. 
''""'''p < . 001 . 
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RZ 
. 6 32 '"'''''' 
. 271 
. 545>h'< 
As can be seen then, the overall regression analysis revealed that 
behavior and behavioral intentions are predictable from a knowledge of 
one's expressed attitudes as they relate to the act of cooperation and 
competition, attitudes toward one's self, and an individual's normative 
beliefs about his/her opponent and a third party. 
Regression: Competitive Cl 
The regression model which predicted behavior from the attitude and 
normative belief measures in the competitive condition had a multiple 
correlation of .591, which was statistically significant, p< .001 (Table 
VII I). Furthermore, the multiple correlation, R2 = .608, for the model 
predicting behavior with the inclusion of Bl as a predictor variable was 
also statistically significant, p < .001 (Table VIII). As in the Cl col-
lapsed analysis, a comparison of these two multiple correlations was 
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made to determine the role behavioral intentions played in the model. 
The results of this comparison revealed a nonsignificant difference, in-
dicating that in the competitive condition, the behavioral intention 
measure does not make a statistically significant contribution to the 
regression equation which predicts behavior from subjects 1 expressed 
attitudes and normative beliefs. Thus, in the competitive Cl condition, 
Bl are not a function of subjects 1 expressed attitudes and normative be-




TABLE V 11 I 
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS AND MULTIPLE CORRELATIONS OF 
ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES ON BEHAVIORAL 
INTENTIONS AND BEHAVIOR, FOR COMPETITIVE Cl 
Re9ress ion Coe ff i c i en ts 
A-act 1 A-act 2 A-self NBl NB2 Bl 
1. 990 .065 .522 -.228 .204 
-0.033 -.248 -.092 .014 . 032'" 
-0.058 -.249 -.099 .017 . 029'" .013 
"'E. < .05. 
~!,~!'E. < .001. 
Regression: Cooperative Cl 
R2 
.257 
. 591 ,•:r: 
. 608:'d: 
When the same comparision was made for the cooperative Cl condition, 
a statistically significant difference, p < .01, was found between the 
multiple correlation for the Bi-excluded regression equation, R2 = .271, 
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when compared to the Bl-included equation, R2 = .545. The results of 
this comparison indicate that when predicting behavior from subjects' 
expressed attitudes and normative beliefs, the inclusion of behavioral 
intentions as a predictor adds significantly to the amount of variance 
accounted for by the model. Thus, when the payoff structure of the 
situation encourages cooperation, behavior may be predicted from a knowl-
edge of subjects' expressed attitudes and normative beliefs when combin-
ed with their expressed behavioral intentions. Additionally, it was 
demonstrated in the cooperative condition that behavioral intentions 
could be successfully predicted from a knowledge of subjects' expressed 
attitudes and normative beliefs (Table VI I), while B could not. 
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
The present investigation answered a number of specific questions 
regarding third-party mediation of conflict. In particular, what effect 
did the manipulation of the payoff structure of the situation have on 
subjects' subsequent cooperativeness in a conflict situation involving 
a neutral third party? How did suggestions from a neutral third party 
affect cooperative behavior? In what ways did these two variables affect 
an individual's attitudes and no~mative beliefs? Finally, what was the 
relationship between attitudes, normative beliefs, behavioral intentions, 
and behavior in a conflict situation involving neutral third-party inter-
vention? 
In answer to these questions, the results of the present investiga-
tion clearly demonstrated that cooperativeness was affected by the pay-
off structure of the situation when a neutral third party made sugges-
tions to disputants in a conflict game. In addition, it was shown that 
suggestions from a neutral third party did affect subjects' normative 
beliefs about the third party, but did not directly affect cooperative 
behavior. Moreover, it was demonstrated that subjects' attitudes, nor-
mative beliefs, and behavioral intentions were affected by the payoff 
structure of the situation as well as the normative suggestions made to 
the disputants by a neutral third party. These findings are in basic 
agreement with those of earlier studies (Ajzen, 1971; Ajzen & Fishbein, 
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1970) which support Fishbein's (1977) model of attitude-behavior rela-
tions. Behavioral intentions do appear to mediate effects of situation-
al variables on cooperative behavior. It also appears that the payoff 
structure of the situation is of greater relative importance to disput-
ants than suggestions from a neutral third party when deciding to coop-
erate or compete in a conflict situation. 
Attitudes 
While many studies have explored the relation between attitudes and 
behavior, the results have often been disappointing. In the past, atti-
tudinal and behavioral measures have often been selected in an arbitrary 
manner which may account for the inconsistent research findings. 
A systematic approach to studying attitude-behavior relations has 
been profferred by Ajzen and Fishbein (1977). They suggest that a sin-
gle behavior is determined by an individual 1 s intention to perform the 
behavior in question. Furthermore, a person's intentions are claimed to 
be a function of his/her attitude toward performing the behavior and of 
his/her subjective norm. An attitude may be thought of as a person's 
evaluation of the entity in question, while behavior may be thought of 
as one or more observable actions performed by the individual. In addi-
tion, attitudinal and behavioral entities consist of four different ele-
ments: the action, the target at which the action is directed, the con-
text in which the action is performed, and the time in which it is 
performed. The strength of an attitude-behavior relation depends on the 
degree of correspondence between attitudinal entities. It has been shown 
that significant relations between attitudes and behavior are usually 
obtained when there is a close correspondence between elements making 
up attitudinal and behavioral entities (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977). 
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In the present investigation, a close correspondence existed be-
tween attitudinal and behavioral elements. The four elements of the be-
havioral entity consisted of the action (making Choice 1 or Choice 2 in 
a PD game); the target at which the action was directed (choosing a co-
operative strategy or cooperation); the context in which the action was 
performed (alone in a 5x8 sound attenuated experimental room); and the 
time in which it was performed (a particular 60-minute period). 
In relation to the behavioral elements, the attitudinal elements 
consisted of the action (the attitude toward making Choice 1 and Choice 
2 based upon four semantic differential questions); the target at which 
the action was directed (the attitude toward choosing a cooperative 
strategy or Choice l and the attitude toward one 1 s own particular 
choices); the context in which the action was performed (the same exper-
imental room in which behavior was measured); and the time in which it 
was performed (the same 60-minute period during which behavior was mea-
sured). As can be seen, a close correspondence between the attitudinal 
and behavioral entities existed in the design of the present investiga-
tion. The context was virtually identical for both the attitudinal and 
behavioral entities. The time was also very close, with 10 trials of a 
PD game separating the measurement of attitudes and behavior. 
As a result of this close correspondence, a strong relationship was 
expected to exist between the attitudinal and behavioral measures. As 
can be seen in Table I I I, a strong positive relationship existed for al 1 
of the attitudinal measures in relation to the behavioral measure. From 
this correspondence, the prediction of behavior is expected from a 
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knowledge of attitudes, subjective norms, and behavioral intentions. 
The present investigation demonstrated that cooperative behavior in a 
conflict situation employing a neutral third party is predictable from 
subjects 1 expressed attitudes, normative beliefs, and behavioral inten-
tions (Appendix 1). While it was demonstrated that behavioral inten-
tions are a function of attitudes and normative beliefs in third-party 
mediation of conflict, it also appears that behavioral intentions may 
contain a unique subjective component which adds significantly to the 
overall regression model in predicting cooperative behavior (Table VI). 
When an examination of the regression data predicting behavior from 
attitudes and normative beliefs is made separately for each level of 
Cooperation Index, it becomes evident that the role played by behavior-
al intentions is quite different in the two models. With a cooperative 
payoff structure, it appears that behavioral intentions are a function 
of subjects 1 expressed attitudes and normative beliefs, and that behav-
ior may be accurately predicted from a model which includes all three 
components (see Appendix I). A similar relationship has also been demon-
strated by Ajzen and Fishbein (1970). 
In contrast, it was demonstrated in the competitive condition that 
attitudes and normative beliefs affect behavior directly, and that be-
havioral intentions are not a function of attitudes and normative beliefs 
in the prediction of cooperative behavior. Behavioral intentions add 
little to the regression equation in predicting cooperative behavior with 
a competitive payoff structure. 
One possible explanation for the discrepancy between these two mod-
els, regarding the relative importance of Bl, may be found in Figure 5 
and Table I I. By closely examining these data, it becomes evident that 
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subjects were more definite about their feelings (i.e., attitudes) and 
normative beliefs about the mediator than they were about their inten-
tions to behave in a particular way in the competitive Cl. Furthermore, 
the weak relationship which exists between Bl and B in the competitive 
Cl, r = .34, may have been due to the possible influence of subjects 1 
normative beliefs about the opponent, which were in opposition to the 
strategy encouraged by the competitive Cl (Table II). Possibly, this 
influenced subjects to express intentions which were slightly more coop-
erative than their subsequent behavior. In the cooperative Cl condition, 
it is evident that subjects 1 attitudes, normative beliefs about the medi-
ator, and behavioral intentions were slightly more positive toward coop-
eration than might be expected from the strategy encouraged by the coop-
erative Cl. Subjects in this situation may have felt a need to appear 
cooperative and favorable to others, since the appropriate choice to 
make was somewhat ambiguous to begin with. 
In summary, behavioral intentions played a significant role in the 
present investigation when subjects were exposed to the cooperative Cl 
but not when operating with the competitive Cl. In the competitive Cl 
attitudes and normative beliefs were better predictors of game behavior 
than Bl. 
Situational Variables 
The effects of the Cooperation Index on cooperative behavior clear-
ly support the results of other investigations (Ajzen, 1971; Ajzen & 
Fishbein, 1970; Rapoport & Chammah, 1965) which also demonstrate that 
different payoff matrices in a Prisoner 1 s Di lemma situation produce 
different levels of cooperation. It was further demonstrated that 
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normative messages from a neutral third party affected subjects' norma-
tive beliefs about the mediator, and therefore indirectly affected their 
behavior (Appendix I). This finding supports those found by Ajzen (1971), 
who demonstrated that subjects' cooperative behavior in a similar Prison-
er's Dilemma situation was affected by a generalized normative message 
given to subjects at the beginning of the game. 
Furthermore, it was found that the manipulation of the payoff ma-
trices clearly affected the subjects' attitudes and behavioral intentions. 
In addition, the results revealed that normative suggestions from a neu-
tral third party directly affect subjects' normative beliefs, and indir-
ectly subjects' subsequent cooperativeness in a conflict situation. 
The relative importance of the Cl manipulation, in relation to the 
mediator 1 s suggestions, may be seen in Table I I I. One possible explana-
tion for the importance of the Cl manipulation relative to the mediator's 
suggestions may be the motivational significance associated with the pay-
off matrices. The present investigation was designed so that subjects 
could acquire monetary gains by making choices in a Prisoner's Dilemma 
situation. These choices were in turn associated with a particular pay-
off structure designed to encourage either cooperation or competition, 
depending upon the particular treatment group a given subject was in. 
Since the points each subject could win were associated directly with 
monetary gains or losses, one might argue that the payoff structure of 
the situation possessed greater motivational significance for subjects 
than suggestions from a third party. 
However, in discussing the Cl manipulation, it is helpful to under-
stand some of the more practical implications of this treatment variable. 
In order to maintain a competitive situation in general, the computation 
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of Cl must fall between 0 and 1.0. A Cl of 0. 10 may be construed as a 
competitive Cl, while a Cl equal to 0.90 may be thought of as coopera-
tive, or less competitive. The cooperative Cl as it has been used in 
the present investigation was one which should have encouraged a cooper-
ative strategy by subjects, while a competitive Cl was one which should 
have encouraged predominantly competitive choices by subjects. It should 
be noted that in practical terms, a cooperative Cl (Cl= 0.90) is a pay-
off structure which would 11sl ightly11 encourage competitive responses 
from subjects, maintaining the competitive nature of the paradigm employ-
ed in a PD game. In other words, while a Cl= 0.90 has been referred to 
as a cooperative Cl in the present study, it is in fact designed to en-
courage some competitive responses from subjects. However, it is very 
close to a neutral payoff structure, or one which only minimally encour-
ages competition. This means that the dilemma faced by subjects in the 
cooperative Cl is that of making Choice 1 or Choice 2, both of which 
appear as attractive alternatives, with Choice 2 being only slightly 
more attractive than Choice 1, the cooperative choice. While the two 
Cooperation Indices employed in the present investigation were referred 
to as cooperative and competitive, in practical terms the two matrices 
were neutral-to-slightly competitive, and highly competitive. 
This leads to the conclusion that it was not the monetary salience 
of the payoff structure which accounted for the greater affect of the Cl 
manipulation relative to third-party suggestions. As can be seen (Appen-
dix H) the results indicated that the mediator 1 s suggestions for coopera-
tiveness did not have a significant effect on subjects 1 cooperativeness, 
even when such encouragement was combined with a cooperative payoff 
structure (Cl). Suggestions from a third party would be expected to 
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have their greatest effect in the condition where neither cooperative 
nor competitive responses possessed greater salience, as is the case 
with a cooperative Cl. Logically, one might assume that when faced with 
a situation where a greater payoff would not be gained by making either 
Choice l or Choice 2, subjects would be most likely to follow the sugges-
tions of a third party. In the present investigation, third-party sug-
gestions had little if any direct effect on cooperativeness. It is 
clear, however, that subjects did attend to the suggestions made by the 
third party, as evidenced by subjects' normative beliefs about the medi-
ator. Subjects apparently received and understood the suggestions, but 
thei:r ultimate cooperativeness was unaffected by this manipulation. Sub-
jects were, instead, affected to a greater degree by the monetary gains 
and losses associated with the particular strategy encouraged by each of 
the payoff matrices. 
Those individuals in the competitive Cl condition felt significant-
ly more positive about being competitive than those in the cooperative 
Cl. Furthermore, the competitive Cl group also felt less positive about 
being cooperative than did the cooperative Cl group. Another interest-
ing result regarding attitudes concerns subjects' perceptions of them-
selves. Those individuals in the competitive Cl expressed significantly 
more positive feelings about their behavior than those in the coopera-
tive condition. Apparently it feels 11 good 11 to compete. 
While Cooperation Index did affect attitudes, behavioral intentions 
and behavior, it did not have any effect on the two normative belief 
measures. However, subjects 1 expressed normative beliefs about the medi-
ator were affected by the type of normative suggestions made by the medi-
ator. Subjects in the cooperative suggestion condition believed that 
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the mediator expected them to be more cooperative than those subjects in 
the competitive suggestion condition, while those subjects receiving the 
no-suggestion message rated their expected level of cooperativeness be-
tween the other two conditions. 
Conclusions 
Several important conclusions may be drawn from the present inves-
tigation. First, it seems clear that when a conflict situation involves 
a neutral third party and the situational payoffs encourage cooperation, 
then attitudes about an actor's behavior, beliefs about what others ex-
pect them to do, and the actor's intentions regarding what he/she may do 
are useful in the prediction of an actor's subsequent cooperativeness. 
Attitudes about an actor's behavior and beliefs about what others 
expect him/her to do may be useful in predicting that actor's expressed 
behavi ora I intentions. In addition, what the person says he/she wi 11 do 
is highly predictive of what they will actually do, particularly when 
the payoff structure encourages cooperation. In the situation where the 
payoffs to the individual encourage competition with the opponent, the 
intentions one expresses about future behavior may be of little value in 
predicting that person's subsequent cooperativeness. 
The present investigation also points out the importance of "real 11 
(i.e., monetary) gains and losses. Following the experiment, several 
subjects indicated that the monetary payoffs greatly influenced their 
choices, relative to the suggestions from the third party. It is believ-
ed that the present results may be readily generalized to real-world 
situations in which disputants are engaged in a conflict situation 
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involving a neutral third party, and where disputants stand to gain or 
lose real monetary payoffs. 
It is evident that the salient situational variable affecting be-
havior was the strategy each of the particular payoff conditions encour-
aged. Those individuals in the cooperative Cl condition were more coop-
erative than those in the competitive Cl in their game strategies. It is 
also interesting to note that the payoff structure of the situation 
affected only the expressed attitudes of the subjects and not their nor-
mative beliefs. The mediator's suggestions, on the other hand, affected 
only subjects' normative beliefs about what he/she thought the mediator 
expected them to do, but had little effect if any on actual behavior in 
subsequent trials of the game. It would appear then, in contrast to the 
findings of Ajzen (1971), that subjects pay very little attention to sug-
gestions made by a third party when the payoffs of the situation are re-
lated to motivationally significant gains and losses. The results of 
the present study also indicate that the subjects were cognizant of the 
suggestions made by the mediator, but chose not to follow the mediator's 
suggestions. 
One argument which might be raised, however, is that subjects may 
not have trusted the third party. This might be expected in the situa-
tion where the suggestions made by the third party were obviously con-
trary to the best interests of the players. For instance, with a com-
petitive Cl and where subjects received suggestions from the third party 
advocating predominantly cooperative choices, a subject might logically 
be expected to mistrust the third party. However, in a situation where 
third-party suggestions advocated a strategy coincident with that en-
couraged by the payoff structure, subjects should be expected to develop 
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great trust and follow the suggestions even more. This was not the case, 
as indicated by the results. Suggestions from the third party had no 
significant effect in either case on subjects' subsequent cooperative-
ness. 
One limitation of the present investigation is that it does not 
adequately assess other motivational factors which disputants may con-
tend with in a naturalistic setting involving third-party mediation. 
In many situations, there are more than two dichotomous alternatives 
which disputants are compelled to choose between. In addition, there 
may be multiple personal gain and loss factors which individuals consid-
er in making a decision to cooperate or compete. The present investiga-
tion explored one area, the personal gains and losses associated with 
each of two separate PD game matrices. 
Another factor which remains unclear is the exact role played by 
normative beliefs in conflict resolution. The results indicate that nor-
mative beliefs made a contribution to the overal 1 model predicting behav-
ior, even though they remained unaffected by the manipulation of Cl. It 
is interesting to note the results found in Table I I which indicate that 
subjects' normative beliefs about their opponent were almost identical 
for both the competitive and cooperative Cl (M = .58). Thus, subjects 
believed their opponents expected them to be slightly cooperative regard-
less of the payoff structure. 
As a result of the present findings, several questions are raised. 
What are the various motivational factors involved in a disputant's deci-
sion to cooperate or compete in a naturalistic setting? What role exact-
ly do normative beliefs play, if any, in the resolution of conflict by a 
third party? Finally, under what circumstances would an individual in a 
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conflict situation be expected to comply with suggestions from a neutral 
third party? 
Whatever the answers to these questions, the present investigation 
has provided information which points to the importance of payoff struc-
ture in a conflict situation involving a neutral third party, and raises 
serious doubts about the effectiveness of suggestions from a neutral 
third party. 
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Your task today will involve communicating with another person. 
But rather than just talk to each other, all of the communication will 
be accomplished with the use of the machine in front of you. Each of 
you will use a communication panel because you are in separate rooms. 
In order to familiarize you with the procedures involved, we will 
practice the process using the machines. The other two people that you 
saw are in separate rooms adjacent to this one. One of the players has 
a machine identical to the one located in front of you. S/he will be 
the other player. The other person is in a room connected with both 
you and the other player. This person will be the mediator. His/her 
machine is similar to yours, except that the mediator's sole function 
will be to make suggestions to you and the other player regarding 
choices you will be making. 
The overall objective for the players is to accumulate as many 
points as possible. Notice that the player's panels each have a matrix 
of four squares containing various numbers with plus and minus signs. 
The numbers in the upper triangles of each square correspond to the num-
ber of points you would receive in a particular round. Your opponent 
would receive the number of points designated in the lower triangle of 
the square. The points you receive in a round depend partly on a choice 
which you wi 11 make, and partly upon a choice your opponent makes. No-
tice that if you both make Choice 1, you both gain points (demonstrate), 
whereas if you both make Choice 2, you both lose points (demonstrate). 
If you make Choice 1 and your opponent makes Choice 2, then the outcome 
is that your opponent gains while you lose points (demonstrate). Like-
wise, if you make Choice 2 and your opponent makes Choice 1, the outcome 
is that you gain and your opponent loses points (demonstrate). So you 
see, you gain or lose points depending on the choices you and your oppo-
nent make on a given round. Remember, the objective is to gain as many 
points as possible, and to avoid losing points. 
In addition, you will receive one cent for every point you gain 
during the game. Likewise, you will lose one cent for every negative 
point. At the end of the experiment you may keep any money you have 
accumulated dur~ng the course of the game. Since it is possible for you 
to lose points (money) right from the beginning, you will begin at 100. 
Once again, any money you have at the end of the game is yours to keep. 
Now here is a scoring sheet so that you may keep track of your money as 
the game progresses (Appendix G). 
You will also receive a message from the mediator just prior to 
making your choice. This message will be in the form of a suggestion, 
as you can see on your communication panel. The mediator has been in-
structed to try to maintain the greatest equity between the two players. 
However, it is totally up to you as to whether you follow the mediator 1 s 
suggestions. In other words, the only thing that affects the number of 
points you gain or lose is the points each of the players makes on a 
given round. The mediator will be making suggestions to the players 
only in order to maintain the greatest equity between them. Here is a 
summary of your instructions. 
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1. When the red Mediator Suggestion light comes on, a messagewill 
be sent to you by the mediator. 
2. When the red Choose light comes on, make Choice 1 or Choice 2. 
The points you have lost or gained will light up in the matrix at the 
center of the machine. 
Remember that you will be rece1v1ng one cent for every point you 
gain, and that you will be losing one cent for every negative point. 
You may keep any money you have accumulated at the end of the game. 
I am now going to give you a short multiple choice quiz to make 
sure that there are no misunderstandings about the instructions. (Now 
give the quiz, score it, and correct any misunderstandings.) 
I am going to leave the room now. The game will be starting momen-
tarily when you receive the mediator's first suggestion. You should 
then make your first choice, Choice l or Choice 2. Remember, keep track 
of your points with the scoring sheet so you know how you are doing. 
The mediator will also be keeping track of your points. (After the 
first 10 rounds, interrupt the game and administer the attitude ques-
tionnaire, Appendix D.) 
am now going to stop the game momentarily, because I would like 
to get your responses to several questions concerning the game so far. 
(After the subject has completed the attitude questionnaire, resume the 
game for the final 10 rounds.) (Once the game is finished, debrief the 
subject, have him/her sign the confidentiality form, and dismiss.) 
APPENDIX B 
QUIZ OVER PROCEDURES 
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l. When the light beside Mediator 1 s Suggestion comes on, 
a. the game is over. 
b. take note of the mediator 1 s suggestion. 
c. calculate your points. 
2. When the red Choose light comes on, you should 
a. sit back and wait. 
b. calculate your points. 
c. make 11 Choice 111 or 11 Choice 2. 11 
3. After you have made your choice, 
a. add or subtract the points in the upper triangle to your total • 
b. add or subtract the points in the lower triangle to your total . 
c. do nothing, the game is over. 




5. At the end of the game, you may 
a. keep any money you have accumulated. 
b. not keep any money you have accumulated. 
c. forget about money, because you were just playing with points. 
APPENDIX C 
DIAGRAM OF PD MACHINE 
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1. Making Choice l is 
foolish : : : : : : wise -- -- -- -- -- -- --
good . . . . . . . . . . . . -- -- -- -- -- -- -- bad 
harmful . . . . . . . . . . . . beneficial -- -- -- -- -- -- --
rewarding __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ punishing 
2. Making Choice 2 is 
foolish : : : : : : wise -- -- -- -- -- -- --
good . . . . . . . . . . . . -- -- -- -- -- -- -- bad 
harmful . . . . . . . . . . . . beneficial -- -- -- -- -- -- --
rewarding __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ punishing 
3. The choices I made were 
foolish : : : : : : wise -- -- -- -- -- -- --
good . . . . . . . . . . . . -- -- -- -- -- -- -- bad 
harmful . . . . . . . . . . . . beneficial -- -- -- -- -- -- --
rewarding __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ punishing 
4. My opponent thinks that I should make Choice % of the time, 
and Choice 2 % of the time. 
5. The mediator thinks that I should make Choice l % of the time, 
and Choice 2 % of the time. 
6. I intend to make Choice l 
the time. 






This completes your participation in the study. There really was 
no right or wrong way to respond. Your natural responses will greatly 
help us to understand how people in general react in this type of situa-
tion. As you might have guessed, this is a study about conflict between 
people. Our basic purpose is to see what effects a third party will 
have on how people deal with a conflict. The study will involve several 
different types of conflict situations and we will be comparing between 






I hereby agree to keep any information concerning this experiment 
in strictest confidence until the experiment is completed and at which 
time the full nature and results of this experiment are made available 
to all who participated and would like any information. 
Date: 
Signed: 
Thank you for participating and for your confidentiality. If you 
have any problems or questions concerning this experiment, feel free to 
contact me. 
Mark Winkel 
010 S. Murray Hal 1 
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ANOVA SUMMARY TABLES 
Sum of 
Source D. F. Squares F-Va I ue PR> F 
Dependent Variable: A-act 1 
Model: 
Cl 1 248.07 8.75 ~':: 
Medi ator 1 s Suggestion 2 48.43 0.85 NS 
Cl x Mediator's Suggestion 2 156.03 2. 75 NS 
Error 54 1531. 40 
Dependent Variable: A-act 2 
Model: 
Cl I 390. 15 13.20 ;':. ;':: 
Mediator's Suggestion 2 80.03 1. 35 NS 
Cl x Medi ator 1 s Suggestion 2 1 35. l 0 2.29 NS 
Error 54 1595.70 
Dependent Variable: A-self 
Mode 1 : 
Cl 1 64.07 4.45 ·}:.·k-k. 
Mediator 1 s Suggestion 2 83.63 2.90 NS 
Cl x Medi ator 1 s Suggestion 2 20.23 0.70 NS 
Error 54 777. 80 
Dependent Variable: NBI 
Model: 
Cl 1 3.75 0.01 NS 
Mediator 1 s Suggestion 2 1473.43 I. 33 NS 
Cl x Mediator's Suggestion 2 549.10 0.50 NS 
Error 54 29850.30 
Dependent Variable: NB2 
Mode 1 : 
Cl 1 8.87 0.03 NS 
Mediator's Suggestion 2 6459.30 11. 84 ·;':. -;': 
Cl x Mediator's Suggestion 2 415.63 0.76 NS 
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Error 54 40480.20 
Dependent Variable: B 
Model: 
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Error 54 363. 10 
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Attitudes. Relatively lasting organizations of feelings, beliefs, and 
behavior tendencies directed toward specific persons, groups, ideas, 
objects. 
A-act. A person 1 s attitude toward performing a specific behavior in a 
specific situation. 
A-actl. An individual 1 s attitude toward the act of cooperation. 
A-act2. An individual 1 s attitude toward the act of compensation. 
A-self. An individual 1 s attitude toward him/herself based upon a given 
behavior in a given situation. 
Behavior (B). One or more observable actions performed by an individual 
in a specific situation. 
Behavioral Intentions (Bl). An individual 1 s intention to perform a given 
act which is a joint function of his/her attitude toward performing 
that behavior and of his/her beliefs about what 11others 11 expect him/ 
her to do in that situation. 
Cooperation Index (Cl). An index of 11cooperative advantage 11 related to 
the proportion of cooperative choices in a conflict game. 
Normative Beliefs (NBs). An individual 1 s beliefs about what he/she is 
expected to do in a given situation. 
NBl. An individual 1 s beliefs about what the other player expects him/her 
to do. 
NB2. An individual's beliefs about what the mediator expects him/her to 
do. 
Prisoner 1 s Dilemma Game (PDG). A game based upon a situation involving 
strong pressures toward both cooperation and competition. 
~ 
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